home
***
CD-ROM
|
disk
|
FTP
|
other
***
search
/
Shareware Overload Trio 2
/
Shareware Overload Trio Volume 2 (Chestnut CD-ROM).ISO
/
dir33
/
1761_r.zip
/
CHAPTER.5
< prev
next >
Wrap
Text File
|
1993-03-21
|
12KB
|
229 lines
Constitutional Law
"Constitution of this state declares, among inalienable rights
of each citizen, that of acquiring, possessing and protecting
property. This is one of primary objects of government, is
guaranteed by constitution, and cannot be impaired by legislation."
Billings v. Hall (1857), 7 C. 1.
"Right of protecting property, declared inalienable by
constitution, is not mere right to protect it by individual force,
but right to protect it by law of land, and force of body politic."
Billings v. Hall (1857), 7 C. 1.
"Right of transit through each state, with every species of
property known to constitution of United States, and recognized by
that paramount law, is secured by that instrument to each citizen,
and does not depend upon uncertain and changeable ground of mere
comity." In Re Archy (1858), 9 C. 47.
"Traveling is passing from place to place--act of performing
journey; and traveler is person who travels." In Re Archy (1858),
9 C. 47.
"Right to possess and protect property is not more clearly
protected by constitution, than right to acquire it. Right to
acquire is right to use prpoer means to attain end; and use of such
means, cannot be prohibited by legislature, except peace and safety
of state require it." In Re Newman (1858), 9 C. 502.
"Governmental power only extends to restraining each one in
freedom of his conduct so as to secure perfect protection to all
others from every species of danger to person, health, and
property; that each individual shall be required to use his own as
ot to inflict injury upon his neighbors; and these seem to be all
immunities which can be justly claimed by one portion of of society
from another, under government of constitutional limitation." In
Re Newman (1858), 9 C. 502.
"As general rule men have natural right to do anything which
their inclinations may suggest, if it be not evil in itself, and in
no way impairs the rights of others." In Re Newman (1858), 9 C.
502.
"To say that one may not defend his own property is usurpation
of power by legislature." O'Connell v. Judnich (1925), 71 C.A.386,
235 P. 664.
"Owner has constitutional right to use and enjoyment of his
property." Simpson v. Los Angeles (1935), 4 C.2d 60, 47 P.2d 474.
"Right of property antedates all constitutions. Every person
has right to enjoy his property and improve it according to his own
desires in any way consistent with rights of others." People v.
Holder (1921), 53 C.A. 45, 199 P. 832.
"Right of property is invaded if owner is not at liberty to
contract with others respecting manner in which and terms on which
his property shall be improved." People v. Holder (1921), 53 C.A.
45, 199 P. 832.
"Police power may not be invoked under guise of general
welfare to interfere with sale by individual of his own property
when acquiring and possession of such property is not contrary to
law." People v. Pace (1925), 73 C.A. 548, 559, 238 P. 1089.
"Wherever right to own property is recognized in free
government, practically all other rights become worthless if
government possesses uncontrollable power over property of
citizen." House v. Los Angeles County Flood Control District
(1944), 25 C.2d 384, 153 P.2d 950.
"Constitutional guarantee securing to every person right of
acquiring, possessing, and protecting property refers to right to
possess absolutely and unqualifiedly every species of property
recognized by law and all rights incidental thereto, including
right to dispose of such property in such manner as he pleases."
People v. Davenport (1937), 21 C.A. 292, 69 P.2d 396.
"Constitutional right of acquiring and possessing property
includes right to dispose of such property in such innocent manner
as owner pleases and to sell it for such price as he can obtain."
People v. Davenport (1937), 21 C.A. 292, 69 P.2d 396.
"Clause in constitution guaranteeing right of acquiring
property does not deprive legislature of power of prescribing mode
of acquisition, or of regulating conduct and relations of members
of society in respect to property rights." In Re Andrews (1861),
18 C. 678; In Re Schrader (1867), 33 C. 279.
The Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its
words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary, as
distinguished from technical meaning; where the intention is
clear, there is no room for construction, and no excuse for
interpolation or addition." Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat
304; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat 419; Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat
419; Craig v. Missouri, 4 Pet 10; Tennessee v. Whitworth, 117
U.S. 139; Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 662; Hodges v. United
States, 203 U.S. 1; Edwards v. Cuba R. Co., 268 U.S. 628; The
Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655; (Justice) Story on the
Constitution, 5th ed., Sec 451; Cooley's Constitutional
Limitations, 2nd ed., p. 61, 70.
It cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is
intended to be without effect;..." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
137, 174 (1803)
The Constitution is a written instrument. As such, its meaning
does not alter. That which it meant when it was adopted, it
means now." South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448
(1905)
History is clear that the first ten amendments to the
Constitution were adopted to secure certain common law rights of
the people, against invasion by the Federal Government." Bell v.
Hood, 71 F. Supp., 813, 816 (1947) U.S.D.C. -- So. Dist. CA
In the United States, Sovereignty resides in the people, who act
through the organs established by the Constitution." Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 Dall 419, 471; Penhallow v. Doane's Administrators, 3
Dall 54, 93; McCullock v. Maryland, 4 Wheat 316, 404, 405; Yick
Yo Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370.
The necessities which gave birth to the constitution, the
controversies which precede its formation and the conflicts of
opinion which were settled by its adoption, may properly be taken
into view for the purposes of tracing to its source, any
particular provision of the constitution, in order thereby, to be
enabled to correctly interpret its meaning. Pollock v. Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 558.
The values of the Framers of the Constitution must be applied
in any case construing the Constitution. Inferences from the
text and history of the Constitution should be given great
weight in discerning the original understanding and in
determining the intentions of those who ratified the
constitution. The precedential value of cases and
commentators tends to increase, therefore, in proportion to
their proximity to the adoption of the Constitution, the Bill
of Rights, or any other amendments. Powell v. McCormack, 395
U.S. 486, 547 (1969)
To disregard such a deliberate choice of words and their natural
meaning, would be a departure from the first principle of
constitutional interpretation. "In expounding the Constitution
of the United States," said Chief Justice Taney in Holmes v.
Jennison, 14 U.S. 540, 570-1, "every word must have its due force
and appropriate meaning; for it is evident from the whole
instrument, that, no word was unnecessarily used, or needlessly
added. The many discussions which have taken place upon the
construction of the Constitution, have proved the correctness of
this proposition; and shown the high talent, the caution and the
foresight of the illustrious men who framed it. Every word
appears to have been weighed with the utmost deliberation and its
force and effect to have been fully understood." Wright v.
United States, 302 U.S. 583 (1938)
The language of the Constitution cannot be interpreted safely,
except where reference to common law and to British institutions
as they were when the instrument was framed and adopted. The
statesmen and lawyers of the convention who submitted it to the
ratification of conventions of the thirteen states, were born and
brought up in the atmosphere of the common law and thought and
spoke in its vocabulary...when they came to put their conclusions
into the form of fundamental law in a compact draft, they
expressed them in terms of common law, confident that they could
be shortly and easily understood. Ex Parte Grossman, 267 U.S.
87, 108.
The courts are not bound by mere forms, nor are they to be misled
by mere pretences. They are at liberty---indeed, are under a
solemn duty---to look at the substance of things, whenever they
enter upon the inquiry whether the legislature has transcended
the limits of its authority. If therefore, a statute purporting
to have been enacted to protect the public health, the public
morals, or the public safety, has no real or substantial relation
to those objects, or is a palpable invasion of rights secured by
the fundamental law, it is the duty of thye courts to so adjudge,
and thereby give effect to the Constitution. Mugler v. Kansas,
123 U.S. 623, 661
Constitutional provisions for the security of person and property
should be liberally construed. It is the duty of the courts to
be watchful of constitutional rights against any stealthy
encroachments thereon. Boyd v. U.S., 116 U.S. 635.
It cannot be assumed that the framers of the constitution and the
people who adopted it, did not intend that which is the plain
import of the language used. When the language of the
constitution is positive and free of all ambiguity, all courts
are not at liberty, by a resort to the refinements of legal
learning, to restrict its obvious meaning to avoid the hardships
of particular cases. We must accept the constitution as it reads
when its language is unambiguous, for it is the mandate of the
sovereign power. Cook vs. Iverson, 122, N.M. 251.
Where the words of a constitution are unambiguous and in their
commonly received sense lead to a reasonable conclusion, it
should be read according to the natural and most obvious import
of the framers, without resorting to subtle and forced
construction for the purpose of limiting or extending its
operation. A State Ex Rel. Torryson v. Grey, 21 Nev. 378, 32 P.
190.
If the legislature clearly misinterprets a constitutional
provision, the frequent repitition of the wrong will not create a
right. Amos v. Mosley, 74 Fla. 555; 77 So. 619
A long and uniform sanction by law revisers and lawmakers, of a
legislative assertion and exercise of power, is entitled to a
great weight in construing an ambiguous or doubtful provision,
but is entitled to no weight if the statute in question is in
conflict with the plain meaning of the constitutional provision.
Kingsley v. Merril, 122 Wis. 185; 99 NW 1044
Economic necessity cannot justify a disregard of cardinal
constitutional guarantee. Riley v. Carter, 165 Okal. 262; 25 P.
2d 666; 79 ALR 1018
Disobedience or evasion of a constitutional mandate may not be
tolerated, even though such disobedience may, at least
temporarily, promote in some respects the best interests of the
public. Slote v. Board of Examiners, 274 N.Y. 367; 9 NE 2d 12;
112 ALR 660.
When any court violates the clean and unambiguous language of the
Constitution, a fraud is perpetrated and no one is bound to obey
it. (See 16 Ma. Jur. 2d 177, 178) State v. Sutton, 63 Minn. 147,
65 NW 262, 30 L.R.A. 630 Am. St. 459.